Visual Processing in the Action-Oriented Brain by Cameron, Brendan D. & Binsted, Gordon
Selection of our books indexed in the Book Citation Index 
in Web of Science™ Core Collection (BKCI)
Interested in publishing with us? 
Contact book.department@intechopen.com
Numbers displayed above are based on latest data collected. 
For more information visit www.intechopen.com
Open access books available
Countries delivered to Contributors from top 500 universities
International  authors and editors




the world’s leading publisher of
Open Access books










© 2012 Cameron and Binsted, licensee InTech. This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits 
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. 
Visual Processing in the Action-Oriented Brain 
Brendan D. Cameron and Gordon Binsted 
Additional information is available at the end of the chapter 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/48461 
1. Introduction 
Visual processing does not occur in passive systems. We and our evolutionary ancestors are 
and were acting creatures, and our visual systems evolved to enable effective locomotion 
and action. Indeed, sensation of the external world is only evolutionarily meaningful to the 
extent that the sensing organism can respond to the input (accounting for the dearth of eyes 
in the plant kingdom), and if vision’s purpose is action, our understanding of the visual 
brain is likely to be well served by studying vision in an action context. Even for our more 
sedentary activities, like reading, watching TV, or chatting with a friend, our eyes are in 
constant motion, actively gathering information. We are virtually incapable of passive 
vision. Our goals in this chapter are to highlight some of the ways in which seeing is 
coupled to action and to show that our understanding of visual processing can be enhanced 
by considering its relationship to action. To make our case, we will demonstrate that action 
has access to visual information that perception does not, and we will demonstrate that 
actions and action plans influence what we consciously perceive.  
We will begin the chapter with an overview of cortical substrates for visuomotor processing 
and prevailing theories about the division of visual-processing labour in the cortex. We will 
then discuss findings from neuropsychological and behavioural studies and what they have 
taught us about the complex and sometimes counter-intuitive relationship between vision 
and action. Our approach might be considered ecological to the extent that it stresses 
vision’s tight coupling with action processing. Indeed, our analysis focuses mainly on 
functions that are considered to be under the purview of the visuomotor ‘dorsal stream’ in 
the posterior parietal cortex and, as we discuss in the next section, this visual stream is 
thought to be involved in the direct transformation of vision into action. It has previously 
been suggested that the visual functions of the dorsal stream might be those for which an 
ecological approach to vision is appropriate, in contrast to the visual functions of the 
perceptual ‘ventral stream,’ for which a constructivist approach to vision may be more 
fitting [1]. We are sympathetic to this view and to the idea that a greater respect for vision’s 
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behavioural role will assist future vision science. And though we will not be endorsing 
Gibson’s direct perception approach to vision [2] or declaring allegiance to a strictly 
ecological approach to vision, the spirit of our argument will echo J.J. Gibson’s contention 
that vision relies on the moving, acting person in their environment.  
2. Cortical substrates for visuomotor processing 
In the human primary visual pathway, visual input from the retina proceeds, via the lateral 
geniculate nucleus, to primary visual cortex (V1), located in the occipital lobe. Visual 
information then proceeds to extrastriate visual areas in the occipital lobe, posterior parietal 
lobe, and temporal lobe. Our discussion will focus mainly on functional areas within the 
posterior parietal cortex (PPC), which are thought to be involved in the preparation and 
control of visually guided actions. Some of the areas of the PPC that will be particularly 
relevant to the discussion are the parietal-occipital junction (POJ), the superior parietal 
lobule (SPL), the intra-parietal sulcus (IPS), and the inferior parietal lobule (IPL). Studies in 
patient populations have shed light on the functions of these areas, and we address some of 
this work later in the section. First, however, we discuss three theories of cortical 
organization for visual processing that have significantly advanced our understanding of 
extrastriate processing: Mishkin, Ungerleider, and Macko’s [3] two visual stream 
hypothesis, Goodale and Milner’s [4,5] Perception-Action Model (PAM), and Glover’s [6] 
Planning-Control Model (PCM). These theories all posit branching paths of visual output 
from V1, and their differences lie in the functions they assign to each visual processing 
stream. The PAM and the PCM are particularly relevant to our thesis, for they highlight 
regions of parietal cortex devoted to the translation of vision into action.  
Mishkin, Ungerleider, and Macko [3] proposed that the primate visual system is divided 
into two cortical streams: a dorsal stream projecting from primary visual cortex to posterior 
parietal cortex (PPC) and a ventral stream projecting from primary visual cortex to inferior 
temporal cortex (IT). They suggested that the dorsal stream is responsible for processing 
visual information relating to object location (‘where’), while the ventral stream is 
responsible for processing visual information relating to object identity (‘what’). This 
functional division was supported by evidence from monkeys with lesioned PPC, who were 
impaired in their ability to select a target based on its relationship to a landmark object, and 
from monkeys with lesioned IT, who were impaired in their ability to select a target based 
on its shape and surface patterning. 
Goodale and Milner [4,5] suggested an important modification to the two visual streams 
hypothesis. They argued that the functions of the two streams should be considered in terms 
of the purpose for which the visual information is being processed. According to the PAM 
the dorsal stream processes visual information for action (‘how’) and the ventral stream 
processes visual information for perception (‘what’ and ‘perceptual where’). One of the key 
pieces of evidence for Milner and Goodale’s model was the perceptual and motor 
performance of D.F., a patient with visual form agnosia. D.F.’s ability to identify objects and 
their shapes is dramatically impaired. However, her ability to reach to and grasp objects is 
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largely preserved. For example, D.F. can accurately rotate a card to fit through a slot during 
a posting action, but will fail to perceptually report the orientation of the slot [7]. D.F. 
suffered damage to her lateral occipital cortex (LOC) [8] in the ventral stream but has a 
largely intact PPC, and Milner and Goodale [5] inferred that the PPC was responsible for her 
preserved visuomotor function. Milner and Goodale contrast D.F.’s preserved motor 
abilities and pattern of cortical damage with those of patients with optic ataxia (a condition 
we describe in more detail later), who experience impaired goal-directed action and tend to 
have lesions to areas within the PPC [5].  
Additional support for the PAM was provided by studies in non-patient participants 
interacting with visual illusions, which were shown to fool perceptual reports but not goal-
directed actions [e.g. 9,10]. For instance, when participants responded to the central circle in 
the Ebbinghaus illusion, a size-contrast illusion in which the central circle appears larger 
when surrounded by smaller circles, perceptual reports were more susceptible to the 
illusion than actions were [9]. These findings were consistent with the idea that the ventral 
stream considers relationships among objects, driving the size-contrast illusion effects, while 
the dorsal stream considers only the action-relevant parameters of the target object. 
However, conflicting findings across studies and issues relating to task differences among 
perceptual and reach tasks ultimately weakened – though may not have defeated – the case 
from the illusion literature, and we refer the reader elsewhere for an extensive discussion of 
the illusion controversy [11,12].  
Milner and Goodale’s [5] reformulation of the two visual streams hypothesis was possible 
thanks to a consideration of the relationship between action and vision. They shifted the 
focus from the kinds of visual information (spatial vs. identity) to the behavioural role of the 
visual information (acting vs. perceiving). Thus, Milner and Goodale’s [5] model provides 
an example of how thinking about action advanced our understanding of vision.  
Glover’s [6] PCM, like the PAM, also emerged from a focus on the role of action in visual 
processing. Indeed, it shares much in common with the PAM; both models assign 
perceptual/cognitive and visuomotor processes to different cortical streams. Where the PCM 
differs from the PAM is in its proposal that different visual information is used for 
movement planning than for movement control and in its contention that distinct cortical 
areas serve as substrates for the two phases of action. To assist in clarifying the differences 
between the PCM and the PAM, we return, briefly, to the PAM and its view of movement 
preparation and control. 
According to the PAM, the role of the ventral stream is to permit a high-level understanding 
of one’s visual environment and the relationships among the objects within it. Information 
derived from ventral stream processing allows one to select, based on current goals, an 
object for action. Once this is done, control is passed to the dorsal stream, which carries out 
the specification of the movement parameters and monitors online performance. This action 
preparation and online control is, according to Milner and Goodale [5], carried out within 
the superior parietal lobe (SPL) and the intraparietal sulcus (IPS). 
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PCM’s differences from the PAM are related primarily to what factors influence movement 
preparation and what cortical areas are responsible for different kinds of visuomotor 
processing. The PCM proposes a third stream, in the inferior parietal lobe (IPL), that is 
responsible for movement preparation. This stream, according to Glover [6], considers non-
spatial target factors (e.g. object weight) and contextual elements (e.g. background motion), 
which inform -- and, in the case of visual illusions, fool -- the initial preparation of the 
movement. Whereas the PAM places both movement preparation and online control within 
the same ‘how’ stream in the SPL and IPS, Glover’s PCM separates the initial phase of 
movement production (in the IPL) from real-time control (in the SPL), and argues that 
separate representations underlie each phase of the movement. One of the pieces of 
behavioural evidence for the PCM was a careful examination of the unfolding movement 
during actions towards visual illusions. Glover and Dixon [13] showed that the effect of an 
illusion on grip aperture was stronger at the start of the movement and diminished as the 
movement progressed, potentially indicating that movement planning and movement 
control were drawing upon different representations of the target and its environment. 
Glover [6] is not alone in arguing for a third visual stream. Rizzolatti and Matelli [14] have 
argued for a division of labour within the dorsal stream: a dorsal-dorsal stream in the SPL 
that is responsible for online control and a ventral-dorsal stream in the IPL that is involved 
in both action and perception. Pisella et al. [15] have also argued for more than two visual 
streams. We will encounter some of the evidence for a divided dorsal stream in the section 
on optic ataxia.  
2.1. Evidence from patient populations 
We turn next to visual deficits in patients who have suffered damage to different areas of 
visual cortex. We have chosen to focus on three conditions: blindsight, because it provides a 
dramatic example of vision for action without conscious awareness; optic ataxia, because it 
involves damage to the PPC and is informative with regard to action processing in that 
region; and hemispatial neglect, because it provides an important contrast to optic ataxia 
and also provides insight into the role of attention in action. 
2.2. Blindsight 
The term ‘blindsight’ is typically used to describe the phenomenon in patients with lesioned 
V1 who report being unaware of objects in their blind visual field yet remain able to access 
some visual information about objects presented within it. For instance, patients can locate 
stimuli in their blind field for which they do not report any conscious awareness [16]. There 
has been considerable debate regarding the implications of blindsight for conscious visual 
processing and whether incomplete lesioning of V1 can explain performance in blindsight 
patients (see [17,18] for reviews). We will not outline the debate here; rather, we wish to 
highlight the important point that several of the behaviours observed in blindsight -- 
looking at a target [19], pointing to a target [16], or even reaching to post a letter through a 
slot [20] -- involve acting without consciously seeing. These behaviours provide examples of 
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situations where action is able to access visual information that perception cannot. The 
phenomenon is analogous to the one described in the visual agnosia patient D.F., who can 
interact with objects of which she is perceptually unaware [5]. Indeed, Milner and Goodale 
[5] have previously drawn attention to the implications of blindsight for the PAM, and have 
suggested that projections from subcortical structures to areas in the PPC may permit the 
preserved action in blindsight. We refer the reader to that text for a more detailed discussion 
of the evidence. 
A recent blindsight study by Whitwell et al. [21] does provide indirect support for Milner 
and Goodale’s [5] PAM model. Whitwell et al. [21] examined real-time and delayed 
grasping performance in a blindsight patient (S.J.) when she reached to targets presented in 
her blind field. They found that S.J. scaled her grip aperture to target size when movements 
were initiated while the target was ‘visible’ (i.e., not occluded by the experimenter), but 
failed to scale her grip aperture when the target was occluded 2 seconds prior to the 
imperative stimulus. Furthermore, S.J. was incapable of perceptually reporting the size of 
the target presented in her blind field. These findings are consistent with Milner and 
Goodale’s [5] suggestion that the dorsal stream has no memory and only processes currently 
available visual information; however, this inference does rely on the assumption that 
dorsal stream processing is preserved in S.J. 
Independent of any dorsal/ventral considerations, blindsight studies show that goal-
directed actions can uncover visual function that perceptual reports may not. Action’s 
ability to tap into non-conscious vision has also been observed in non-patients: In a later 
section we describe a behavioural study [22] that reveals movement scaling to perceptually-
inaccessible target size, an effect that mimics the non-conscious reach performance in 
blindsight. That study suggests that the putative dorsal-stream processing in blindsight 
patients naturally occurs in non-patient participants, whose visuomotor systems are able to 
see what perception cannot. 
2.3. Optic ataxia 
Optic ataxia is a motor disorder characterized by deficits in goal-directed reaching, and 
neuropsychological investigations of the brain lesions associated with optic ataxia have 
contributed considerably to our understanding of visuomotor processing. However, the 
nature of the disorder is complex, and some of its implications for our understanding of the 
visuomotor dorsal stream are not yet clear. 
One of the main pieces of evidence presented by Milner and Goodale [5] for the PAM is the 
proposed double-dissociation between visual agnosia and optic ataxia. The preserved motor 
function and impaired object perception in D.F., who has lesioned ventral stream and intact 
PPC, contrasts with the impaired motor function and preserved object perception in patients 
with optic ataxia, who have intact ventral streams and lesioned PPC. Other researchers, 
however, have questioned the validity of this double-dissociation [15,6]. 
Part of the difficulty with interpreting performance in optic ataxia stems from the 
observation that motor performance to targets presented in central vision is often 
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comparable to that of controls; major performance deficits appear only when targets are 
presented in the visual periphery [23]. In other words, when patients are able to fixate the 
target, they can accurately reach to it. However, there is evidence that subtle movement 
deficits can be detected when the target is in central vision. A study by Pisella et al. [24], for 
instance, showed that an optic ataxia patient, I.G., who has bilateral lesions to PPC was 
much slower and less fluid than controls in correcting her movements online when a target 
in central vision was displaced during a reach (though this effect, too, may be explained by 
the central/peripheral distinction, for the displacement moved the target away from 
fixation). Such findings have been taken to indicate that the dorsal stream may be more 
important for on-line movement control than it is for the initial parameterization of 
movements [25,6].  
Milner and Goodale [26] have outlined some evidence that counters this view of an ‘on-line 
only’ dorsal stream, noting preparation deficits in optic ataxia as well as the preserved 
movement preparation, not just preserved on-line control, in the visual agnosia patient D.F. 
However, Milner and Goodale [26] do not directly address the central vs. peripheral vision 
discrepancy observed in optic ataxia [15,25] leaving the optic ataxia/visual agnosia double-
dissociation question unresolved. At the very least, however, research on optic ataxia 
suggests that regions within the SPL are involved in transforming visual input to motor 
output. Whether the SPL’s function is restricted to on-line visuomotor processing has yet to 
be determined.  
More recently, Pisella et al. [27] have suggested that the evidence from optic ataxia indicates 
that one of the key functions of the dorsal stream is the spatial coding of targets in an eye-
centered coordinate frame. Pisella et al. [27] assign this spatial coding function specifically to 
the parietal-occipital junction (POJ), a common lesion site in patients with optic ataxia. This 
account helps explain the peripheral target deficit observed in optic ataxia. Pisella et al. [27] 
further argue that dorsal stream function is important for both action and perception. This 
claim is supported by a recent study [28], which showed that optic ataxia patient I.G. was 
not only impaired in her on-line responses to a target displacement, but that she was also 
impaired in her perceptual report of the same target displacement.  
Pisella et al. [27] also raise the important point that the dorsal stream probably has some role 
in perception for another reason: Areas within the dorsal stream are thought to be involved 
in attention orienting, which is fundamental to perceptual processing. Later in the chapter 
we address the important links between attention, perception, and action. In anticipation of 
that discussion, we provide first an overview of hemispatial neglect, a disorder of attention 
and spatial representation that, like optic ataxia, typically results from damage to regions 
within the parietal cortex.  
2.4. Hemispatial neglect 
Patients with hemispatial neglect suffer from a tendency to ignore half of their visual field, 
failing to acknowledge or interact with objects in the neglected field unless strongly 
encouraged to do so. Their performance deficits are generally considered distinct from those 
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of optic ataxia patients, and the reaching deficits in optic ataxia are thought to be related to 
damage to the SPL or POJ, while the performance deficits in neglect are thought to be 
related to damage to the IPL [29].  
Hemispatial neglect theoretically provides an interesting comparison to optic ataxia, for it 
should allow researchers to examine the relationship between attention and visuomotor 
control without the complicating visuomotor deficits present in optic ataxia. It also allows 
researchers to examine the impact, or lack thereof, of impaired visual awareness on motor 
function. However, one of the challenges researchers face when interpreting performance in 
neglect patients lies in ruling out the possibility that any visuomotor deficits observed in 
these patients arise from cortical damage that extends into visuomotor areas. For instance, 
Himmelbach and Karnath [30] have suggested that superior temporal cortex, rather than 
IPL, is directly responsible for the deficits of perceptual space representation found in 
neglect, and that the motor deficits found in some patients with neglect might stem from 
damage that extends to the IPL, a region they argue is involved in spatial coding for motor 
function, but which is not involved in the cognitive spatial coding that characterizes neglect. 
More recently, Himmelbach et al. [31] have argued that the neglect-specific effects of space 
representation are specifically linked to lesion sites at the superior temporal gyrus and 
temporo-parietal junction. They have also suggested that real-time motor control functions, 
such as those observed in optic ataxia, are supported by the POJ, an argument that aligns 
with Pisella et al.’s [27].  
As mentioned earlier, the motor deficits of optic ataxia are particularly prominent when 
participants reach for targets presented in the visual periphery. This contrasts with the 
visuomotor performance of patients with neglect, who generally exhibit accurate motor 
performance to objects presented in their neglected field [31]. Although motor deficits have 
been observed in neglect patients, these tend to be relatively minor compared to the deficits 
of optic ataxia patients. One of the motor performance deficits that has been found in neglect 
patients is a delay in the initiation of reaching movements into their neglected visual field. 
Some studies also indicate minor impairments in online performance, whereas others show 
an absence of any deficits in online control (see [32] for a review). Himmelbach et al. [30,31] 
argue that when a proper control group is used (i.e., patients with parietal damage who do 
not exhibit neglect), hemispatial neglect is not associated with any impairments in 
movement control. However, a recent study by Rossit et al. [33] suggests that neglect 
patients may be slower to correct their movements online compared to both healthy controls 
and right hemisphere patients without neglect. 
In the Rossit et al. [33] study, the authors applied a target jump design modeled after Pisella 
et al.’s [24] design, in which a participant is tasked with either going to a target when it is 
displaced at movement onset (location-go) or trying to stop their movement as soon as the 
target is displaced (location-stop). The location-stop condition allows the researcher to probe 
the automaticity of the online corrections; any deviations toward the target that occur in this 
condition can be attributed to automatic online control. In the location-go condition, neglect 
patients were slower than the control groups, by 80-100ms, to correct their movements 
online when the target jumped into their neglected field. Endpoint accuracy, however, was 
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equivalent across the groups. In the location-stop condition, neglect patients exhibited an 
equivalent number of online corrections to the control groups. The neglect patients, in fact, 
had greater difficulty stopping their movements than the participants in the control groups. 
These results suggest that the ‘automatic pilot’ is intact in neglect patients. However, the 
results also suggest that visuomotor processing in the neglected field is slowed, perhaps as a 
result of impaired attention-for-action in that field. 
Some authors have suggested that optic ataxia and hemispatial neglect represent a double 
dissociation (e.g. [31,32]). In support of this view, a recent case study showed that real-time 
grasping was preserved in a neglect patient’s neglected field, whereas delayed grasping was 
dramatically impaired [34]. These outcomes are the inverse of those in optic ataxia patient 
I.G., who exhibits impaired real-time grasping but actually improves when asked to execute 
a delayed pantomime grasp [35].  
The relative absence of major motor deficits in hemispatial neglect provides a further piece 
of evidence for action having access to visual information that perception does not. As noted 
at the outset of this section, patients with hemispatial neglect have a failure in the perceptual 
representation of part of their visual world. Their visuomotor system’s preserved ability to 
reach to and grasp objects within this neglected field is suggestive of a perception/action 
dissociation, though it may not fall precisely along ventral/dorsal lines. A recent review by 
Harvey and Rossit [29] provides a comprehensive overview of visuomotor function in 
hemispatial neglect, and we direct the interested reader there for a fuller account of the 
syndrome’s complexities and its implications for the functional organization of parietal and 
temporal cortex. 
2.5. Section summary 
We overviewed three theories of cortical organization for visual processing and discussed 
neuropsychological findings from blindsight, optic ataxia, and hemispatial neglect. The 
picture that emerges is one of a modularized PPC, with current evidence favouring the POJ 
and the SPL as key sites for real-time visuomotor computations. Critically, the visuomotor 
processing carried out by these areas appears to proceed automatically, without mediation 
by conscious visual processing. These sites are implicated in direct visual-to-motor 
transformations, and they are areas whose visual functions can only be probed by engaging 
participants in goal-directed movement tasks.  
The visuomotor role of the IPL is somewhat less clear. It is a common lesion site in 
hemispatial neglect, which may implicate it in the orienting of attention. Glover [6] has 
argued that the IPL is important for movement planning, and neglect patients with damage 
to that area do tend to exhibit more motor deficits than neglect patients with undamaged 
IPL [30], which provides some support for Glover’s assertion. At the same time, the 
breakdown in the cognitive spatial representation that is associated with damage to superior 
areas of the temporal cortex [31], a spatial deficit that does not appear to undermine action 
control, is consistent with Milner and Goodale’s [5] argument for different spatial 
representations for perception and action.  
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The findings from patients with cortical lesions to visual areas support the idea that vision-
for-action can proceed independently of vision-for-perception, though the possibility 
remains that the effects observed in patients do not represent the normal function of the 
preserved cortical areas. In the following section we examine converging evidence from 
non-patient participants for the idea that vision-for-action can access information that 
perception does not. 
3. Action can proceed without perception: Evidence from cortically-intact 
participants 
In this section we provide further evidence for action processing without visual awareness. 
We focus on studies in non-patients, which show that even when all areas of visual cortex 
are intact, visual information that drives action can elude conscious detection. This suggests 
that action’s access to unperceived visual information is part of normal visual processing. 
We examine evidence from three different paradigms: backward masking, saccadic 
suppression of target displacement, and motor adaptation. In each case, motor responses to 
events are not only possible, but do not appear to suffer as a result of suppressed visual 
awareness.  
3.1. Evidence from backward masking 
One of the ways that non-conscious visual processing has been investigated is by masking a 
response-relevant stimulus and observing its impact on behaviour. When a stimulus is 
successfully masked, the participant does not report awareness of it. In metacontrast 
masking, for instance, the stimulus to be masked (the prime) is presented and then, shortly 
after, a larger stimulus (the mask) is presented around the prime. This sequence of stimuli 
can eliminate participants’ awareness of the prime while influencing motor responses [36]. 
Taylor and McCloskey [37], for example, used metacontrast masking and showed that the 
reaction times for a motor task were influenced by the unseen prime. When a light was 
briefly flashed and then, 50ms later, 4 lights that closely surrounded the location of the first 
light were flashed, thereby producing a metacontrast mask, participants’ reaction times 
were linked to the presentation of the initial stimulus, in spite of their having failed to 
consciously report its presence. Furthermore, Cressman et al. [38] have shown that 
movements that have already been initiated can be influenced by an unseen directional 
prime, such that participants adjust their movement online. In that study, a directional 
prime (left arrow, right arrow, or neutral stimulus) was presented at movement onset and 
then quickly masked with a larger arrow. Participants’ movement endpoints were dictated 
by the mask, but the unseen directional primes triggered substantial trajectory deviations 
ahead of the explicit response to the mask.  
These results suggest that the motor system can respond to visual information that is 
inaccessible to conscious awareness. However, this does not necessarily imply that the 
prime information is being processed by the dorsal stream. In fact, when the prime is a 
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symbol that must be translated into a directional response (e.g. [36,38]), it is likely that 
ventral stream processing is involved. The perceptual representation of the shape may fail to 
reach awareness, but it is a representation that has the potential to be perceived, which, as 
Milner and Goodale [5] argue, should still be classified as ventrally-mediated. 
However, when the masked stimulus is, itself, the target of the action, direct involvement of 
the dorsal stream is more likely. In a study by Binsted et al. [22], participants were tasked with 
making aiming movements directly to a masked target, the size of which was manipulated 
across trials. The study showed that movement times were scaled to the size of the target 
(shorter times for larger targets, longer ones for smaller targets), in accordance with Fitts’ Law. 
Thus, even though participants did not consciously perceive any changes in the size of the 
target, their motor responses were appropriately tuned to it. This study showed that healthy 
participants could experience a blindsight-like ability to scale their visuomotor response to 
something they could not consciously see. Because the visual information that action is 
drawing upon in this instance is presumably the same information that it would be using in 
the absence of the mask, we can infer that visual processing for immediate action control is not 
normally mediated by conscious vision. Action may have access to sub-threshold conscious 
vision or it may draw upon different visual information altogether, as suggested by the PAM. 
Thus, either as a matter of degree of visual input to which they are sensitive or kind of visual 
input upon which they rely, vision-for-action and vision-for-perception clearly differ. 
3.2. Evidence from reaches to saccadically-suppressed target displacements 
We consider next a very robust dissociation between perception and control that occurs 
when people make simultaneous eye and hand movements. We will take up the perceptual 
effects of saccadic eye movements in more detail in a later section. For the current section, 
one need only know that when a target is displaced during a saccadic eye movement, the 
displacement is largely invisible. Surprisingly, people fail to notice a change in the target’s 
location even when the displacement is as large as one third of the saccade magnitude [39].  
Bridgeman et al. [40] showed that when participants pointed to a target that had been 
displaced during a saccade, they could accurately acquire it, even though they were unaware 
of the change in location. Goodale et al. [41] and Pelisson et al. [42] demonstrated that online 
responses of the motor system were also sensitive to saccadically-displaced targets. They 
showed that even when participants had initiated a reach towards a target’s pre-saccadic 
location, the reach smoothly updated itself to acquire the displaced post-saccadic target 
location. This adjustment to the reach occurred in spite of participants having no vision of their 
hand and no awareness of the target displacement. This effect was also shown for targets that 
were displaced tangentially to the primary axis of the movement [43]. In sum, awareness of a 
target displacement is not needed for motor adjustments to the displacement.  
3.3. Evidence from motor learning in response to unperceived visual changes 
When people encounter an altered visual environment, they adapt their movements over 
the course of exposure to it, such that initially inaccurate movements gradually improve. For 
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example, if one were to view the world through displacing prisms that shifted the visual 
world to the right, one’s movements would initially err to the right of a reach target. Visual 
feedback would allow correction of this error over the course of multiple movements. 
Subsequent removal of the prisms would then produce motor errors in a leftward direction 
(‘aftereffects’) as a result of the newly acquired mapping between vision and motor output. 
The interesting effect for the purposes of the current discussion is that people can acquire 
new visuomotor mappings without any awareness that their visual environment has 
changed. In fact, learning appears to be more robust if people do not know that the 
environment has been altered. Michel et al. [44], for instance, showed that gradually 
incrementing the amount of prism shift, such that participants were unaware of it, led to 
stronger aftereffects than the introduction of a large, consciously detectable prism shift. 
People can also adapt to systematic, imperceptible changes in a target’s location between the 
start and end of their movements. This adaptation can occur when the movement error is 
presented at the end of a reaching movement [45], but it can also occur when the target is 
displaced during the reaching movement, allowing for online corrections that eliminate any 
visual error at the end of the reach [46, cf. 47]. Furthermore, if participants are made aware 
of the target displacement, the amount of adaptation is considerably diminished [48].  
The adaptation effect for reaching movements to displaced targets is similar to the 
adaptation that occurs for eye movements. Saccadic adaptation is a well-documented 
phenomenon in which the size of saccades gradually increases (or decreases) when people 
are repeatedly exposed to forward (or backward) displacements of the target [49]. This 
effect, like the one for reaching movements, is thought to draw upon the natural calibration 
of our movements that occurs throughout our everyday lives, a process that typically occurs 
without any awareness of the error in our movements.  
3.4. Section summary 
Conscious perception of changes in the visual environment is required for neither real-time 
control nor motor learning. In fact, motor learning may even be enhanced if one is unaware 
that a change has occurred. These findings do not necessarily imply that vision for 
perception and vision for action rely on separate cortical streams, but they do show that 
what action sees is not necessarily what perception sees. This is an important point, for it 
suggests that the principles governing vision for perception may differ from those 
governing vision for action. By measuring motor responses, not just perceptual reports, we 
can tap into a wealth of visual processing that we might otherwise miss.  
4. Action influences visual attention and perception 
So far, in discussing topics such as the PAM, blindsight, and masking studies in healthy 
participants, we have devoted much attention to the phenomenon of acting without 
consciously seeing. In this section we turn our attention to perception, and examine some of 
the ways that the intention to act changes what we see. 
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4.1. Saccades in action 
Perhaps the most obvious example of the link between action and perception is eye 
movements. To pick up detailed information about the world around us, we constantly re-
orient our gaze via movements of our eyes and head. Saccades, which are fast and largely 
ballistic, are the most common type of eye movement, and much of our internal 
representation of the visual world is constructed from the detailed snapshots they provide. 
While it is probably not surprising to many of us that saccades are constantly being used to 
shift our gaze and thus inform perception, saccades also influence perception in other more 
subtle ways.  
One perceptually subtle (but experimentally dramatic) effect of saccades is their ability to 
mask large changes in the visual scene. As previously mentioned, saccade targets can be 
displaced by distances as large as a third of the saccade magnitude without the participant 
reporting any change [39]. Entire objects can be rotated or even deleted from a scene during 
a saccade, and participants will fail to notice the change [50]. In short, saccadic eye 
movements introduce periods of change blindness. This effect is thought to be partly due to 
our visual system’s built-in assumption that the world is stable and that trans-saccadic 
changes in object locations are more likely to result from eye movement errors than they are 
to result from actual changes in the scene [51]. Ironically, then, the perceptual effect of 
saccadic suppression is a no-percept effect; suppression serves to keep the visual world 
stable and our conscious perception of it unperturbed. This demonstrates not only that 
oculomotor plans influence perception, but also that our action-driven visual system is 
carefully tuned to compensate for perturbations that are caused by internally generated 
movement. 
4.2. Action goals dictate where our eyes go 
When we reach to, pick up, and use objects to accomplish goals, our eyes precede our 
manual actions, orienting to the relevant parts of relevant objects. Land et al. [52] tracked 
people’s eye movements as they carried out the actions of brewing a cup of tea in a kitchen, 
and the researchers observed that people’s eye movements were tied to the behavioural 
goals; the eyes did not jump from one visually salient object to another but, rather, moved 
deliberately from one task-relevant object to the next. Detailed analysis of eye-hand 
coordination during object grasping and manipulation tells the same story: the eyes are 
drawn to contact points between the hand and the object and between the manipulated 
object and other objects [53,54].  
Furthermore, the coupling between the eyes and the hand appears to be quite strong, and 
will resist conscious attempts to break it. For instance, when people are told to look and 
point to a target and then move their eyes to a new saccade target that appears while the 
hand is in flight, they fail to complete the saccade task. The eyes remain locked on the target 
of the reaching movement until the hand has landed [55]. Thus, the eyes strategically move 
to pick up relevant information for goal-directed action, and they are tightly bound to this 
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task. The coupling between eye and hand is a perfect example of action’s role in dictating 
where and when we acquire visual information from our environment. 
As much as the eyes may want to lead the hand, it is possible to override the coupling by 
fixating the eyes in one location prior to initiating a reach to a peripheral target. The task 
requires some effort on the part of the performer, but it can be done (and is, in fact, well 
employed in laboratory settings when tight control over visual input is desired). You may 
have noticed, for instance, that you can reach for a cup of coffee while keeping your eyes on 
the book or screen before you, though at some cost to movement accuracy. As the next 
sections will show, however, even when the eyes remain locked in place during a manual 
task, visual attention does not; it is bound to action goals.  
4.3. On the relationship between action and attention 
Attention is vital to our experience of the visual world. Most of us have probably 
experienced the frustrating search through a crowded restaurant in which we only see our 
dinner companions after having already walked past them once or twice, or the search that 
happens at the open fridge door, where the item we want, and cannot find, has been in front 
of us all along. Controlled experiments have shown that people will reliably fail to see large 
objects that disappear and reappear in blinking scenes [56] or even fail to see a person in a 
gorilla suit walk through the middle of a scene [57]. Attention is the construct used to 
explain these effects. The idea is that there is far more information in the visual field than 
our brain can or wants to cope with at any one time. The brain, therefore, relies on attention 
to select a portion of visual information for analysis. And, as a result, if we do not attend to 
something, we are blind to it. 
That attention is important for conscious perception is clear. When we consider, however, 
that the purpose of human information processing is not just perception but also action, it is 
also clear that attention systems should not be examined independently of action systems. 
One of the first to raise this point was Allport [58], who noted that the important constraint 
upon visual analysis of a scene may not be central processing limitations, but the need for 
action coherence. Allport’s [58] argument was that motor systems need to be tied to one 
object at a time; if visual information about multiple objects is permitted access to these 
systems simultaneously, the action will fail. The hand, for example, cannot successfully 
grasp a cup if the information guiding the reach is also coming from the apple, the bottle, 
and pencil sitting next to the cup.  
The importance of action to the allocation of attention has also been stressed by Rizzolatti et 
al. [59], who proposed a premotor theory of attention, in which eye-movement motor 
programs drive the spatial allocation of visual attention. Tipper et al. [60] have likewise 
emphasized the role of action in attention, proposing that attention operates within an 
action-centered representation of visual space. Schneider [61], meanwhile, has proposed the 
Visual Attention Model (VAM), a framework in which a central attention mechanism binds 
perceptual and action systems to the same object. Each of these perspectives on the 
relationship between attention and action will be examined next. 
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4.4. Premotor theory 
The premotor theory of attention has probably been the most influential of the action-based 
theories of attention. As initially proposed [59], premotor theory attributed the control of 
attention to oculomotor programming; even when the eyes remained still while attention 
was shifted (covert orienting), the attention shift was purportedly due to the programming 
of an eye movement that was subsequently inhibited. Premotor theory was later modified to 
allow for goal-directed motor programming of any kind (e.g. reaching) to produce attention 
shifts [62], but the basic premise remained the same. The mechanism underlying this process 
was, according to Rizzolatti et al. [62], the activation of neurons in spatial pragmatic maps. 
These pragmatic maps are proposed to reside in brain areas associated with action (e.g., 
parietal reach areas; parietal, frontal, or sub-cortical eye movement areas), and they code 
space only insofar as it is relevant to the action that they are involved in programming. 
Thus, according to premotor theory, there is no higher-level attention system. Rather, 
attention shifts simply result from the selective activation of pragmatic map neurons, and 
this activation only occurs when a movement is programmed to that region of space.  
Some of the strongest support for premotor theory can be found in neurophysiological 
studies. Moore and Fallah [63], for instance, showed a causal link between activation of eye 
movement cortex and the allocation of attention. Moore and Fallah stimulated monkeys’ 
frontal eye field (FEF), a cortical area involved in the control of voluntary eye movements. 
They began by stimulating a part of the FEF with enough current to trigger an eye 
movement. They then reduced the stimulation to a sub-threshold level (i.e., the stimulation 
was too low to trigger an eye movement). They found that this sub-threshold stimulation 
improved the monkey’s ability to detect a change in the target stimulus when the stimulus 
fell within the region of the visual field corresponding to the destination of the eye 
movement that had previously been triggered by supra-threshold stimulation of the FEF. In 
a similar study investigating the attentional role of the superior colliculus (SC) (a subcortical 
area directly involved in the control of eye movements), Muller, Philiastides, and Newsome 
[64] found that sub-threshold stimulation of the SC also produced enhanced detection of the 
target stimulus. Both of these studies demonstrate covert orienting of attention resulting 
from activation of oculomotor areas of the brain, consistent with premotor theory.   
4.5. Action-centered attention 
An important step in understanding attention is determining the nature of the spatial 
representation upon which it operates. Premotor theory suggests that spatial pragmatic 
maps underlie the allocation of spatial attention (though it also states that attention emerges 
from these maps, rather than operating upon them). A related view, advanced by Tipper et 
al. [60], suggests that attention operates upon an action-centered representation. To get a 
better sense of what such a representation might be, we will first consider other kinds of 
spatial representation.  
Tipper et al. [60] outline 4 possible kinds of spatial representation upon which attention 
might operate: a 2-D retina-centered representation, a 3-D viewer-centered representation, 
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an environment-centered representation, and an action-centered representation. A 2-D 
retina-centered representation is one in which the spatial relationships between objects are 
defined in terms of the objects’ relative positions in the 2-D retinal image. Thus, when it 
comes to attention, a distractor on the far side of a target (with respect to the viewer) would 
produce more interference than a distractor on the near side of the target, according to 
Tipper et al., because in the 2-D image the far object is closer to the target than the near 
object is. A 3-D viewer-centered representation, on the other hand, is one in which the 
distance of objects from the viewer is a relevant factor. If attention operates within this kind 
of representation, distractors on the near side of a target would potentially produce greater 
interference than distractors on the far side of the target. This type of representation differs 
from an environment-centered representation in that the orientation of the viewer with 
respect to the objects affects their salience. In the environment-centered representation, 
viewer orientation is irrelevant. Finally, the action-centered representation is one in which 
an object’s potential for interference depends upon its relationship to a planned action path. 
Thus, a distractor that resides within the action path will potentially produce greater 
interference than one that resides beyond the path.  
Tipper et al. [60] provided evidence that, during a reaching task, attention operates within 
an action-centered representation. They had participants reach and press target buttons that 
were arranged in a 3 x 3 array in the horizontal (transverse) plane. Below each button were a 
red and a yellow light. Illumination of the red light indicated that the corresponding button 
was the target; the yellow light was irrelevant to the task, but it would sometimes be 
illuminated simultaneously at a different location, serving as a distractor. Tipper et al. 
examined the cost to the total time (TT) of the reaching movement produced by the 
distractor, and found that TT suffered more (i.e., there was greater interference) when the 
distractor fell within the same row as the target or in a row between the hand start position 
and the target row. Furthermore, when the hand start position was moved to the opposite 
end of the board (i.e., to the far end of the board), the same pattern of results was found, 
ruling out a 3-D viewer-centered representation. Tipper et al., in discussing the mechanism 
underlying the action-centered interference, suggest that motor programs are activated, 
simultaneously, to both the target and the distractor.  
A later experiment by Meegan and Tipper [65] investigated whether the pattern of 
interference observed by Tipper et al. [60] was due to the distractor’s relationship to the 
response path, as Tipper et al. [60] had suggested, or to the distractor’s proximity to the start 
position of the hand. Meegan and Tipper [65] found that proximity to the hand was a better 
predictor of distractor interference. This finding does not necessarily undermine the action-
centered model; Meegan and Tipper [65], for instance, suggest that objects nearer to the 
hand might produce greater response competition than objects farther from the hand, a 
framework consistent with the parallel response activation proposed by Tipper et al. [60]. 
However, it is also possible that, because information about the location of the hand is 
important during action preparation [66], attention may initially be oriented to it, leading to 
greater interference from objects in its vicinity.  
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4.6. The Visual Attention Model and action-perception coupling 
The Visual Attention Model (VAM), like premotor theory, posits that motor preparation and 
perceptual selection are coupled [61,67]. However, VAM differs from premotor theory in 
two major ways. For one, VAM suggests that the coupling between selection-for-action and 
selection-for-perception is bi-directional. In other words, selecting an object based on 
perceptual attributes (e.g. colour) also binds action systems to that object, and selecting an 
object for action (e.g. preparing to grasp an apple) also binds perceptual systems to that 
object. (Premotor theory only allows for action preparation to bind perceptual attention to 
an object.) The other way that VAM differs from premotor theory is that VAM posits an 
independent, higher-level, attention mechanism that binds action and perceptual processes. 
(Premotor theory argues against an independent attention system.) Much of the research 
that has been conducted within the VAM framework does not directly test VAM’s 
predictions against those of premotor theory. As a result, the research presented in this 
section – research that demonstrates the coupling between action and perceptual selection – 
can be taken as support for either VAM or premotor theory. 
Deubel and Schneider [68] provide strong evidence of the coupling between oculomotor 
preparation and visual attention. In one experiment participants were instructed to make a 
saccade to a peripheral target based on a central cue (a number specifying the location of the 
target). After cue presentation, but prior to saccade initiation, a discrimination target (DT) 
(which was a normal ‘E’ or a reverse ‘E’) appeared either at the same location as the saccade 
target (ST) or at a different location. The DT was present very briefly, and was masked prior 
to the onset of the saccade. Participants’ discrimination performance was the dependent 
measure, and Deubel and Schneider [68] used this measure to infer the locus of attention. 
They found that participants’ performance was considerably enhanced when the DT was at 
the ST position. Performance dropped off considerably when the DT was at a different 
position than the ST, even if by only 1 or 2 degrees of visual angle. Because all perceptual 
discrimination occurred prior to any movement of the eyes, these results provide evidence 
of covert orienting resulting from oculomotor preparation. In another experiment, Deubel 
and Schneider [68] showed the same effect when the ST was specified exogenously. 
Furthermore, in order to control for the possibility that covert orienting might be occurring 
independently of saccade preparation rather than being driven by it, Deubel and Schneider 
[68] conducted an experiment in which participants were told beforehand the upcoming 
location of the DT. Participants could then try to attend to the DT location while 
programming a saccade to a different location. Again, however, discrimination performance 
was best at the ST location, suggesting strong coupling between oculomotor programming 
and perceptual selection.  
Deubel, Schneider, and Paprotta [69] extended these findings to show that reaching 
movements have the same impact as oculomotor programming on perceptual selection. The 
experiment’s design was similar to that of Deubel and Schneider [68], but with manual 
aiming movements instead of saccades. A central cue indicated which peripheral object was 
the aiming target (AT), and the participant’s task was to rapidly aim his/her finger to it 
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while maintaining central fixation. The DT was always presented in the same location, so 
participants could attempt to attend to the DT while reaching to the AT. Despite 
participants’ foreknowledge of the DT location, discrimination performance was best when 
the AT coincided with the DT, suggesting obligatory coupling between reach programming 
and perceptual selection. A later study by Deubel and Schneider [70], however, showed that 
the coupling between reaching and perceptual selection persists only for a short period of 
time. If movement onset was delayed by more than 300ms after the imperative stimulus, 
attention could be decoupled from the action target and oriented elsewhere. Eye movements, 
on the other hand, always bound attention to the saccade target, regardless of delay.  
Baldauf, Wolf, and Deubel [71] replicated Deubel et al.’s [69] finding that manual 
preparation orients attention to the aiming target and extended it to show that preparing a 
multiple component movement can orient attention to multiple targets simultaneously. 
Participants executed rapid sequential aiming movements to 2 or 3 targets within a circular 
array of 12 stimuli. Identification of the transiently displayed DT was enhanced when its 
location coincided with the location of any one of the targets of the movement. Identification 
of the DT was poor at other locations, even a location falling directly between two target 
locations. This suggests that action preparation can drive multiple attention ‘spotlights’ in 
parallel.  
A further example of the link between action intention and visual attention was provided by 
Bekkering and Neggers [72], who showed that visual target selection was influenced by 
whether the participant intended to grasp an object or point to it. When participants 
planned to grasp an object within a field of distractor objects, their initial eye movements, 
which were used as a marker of attention capture, were drawn less often to distractors of the 
wrong orientation than when participants intended to point to the target. That is, the 
intention to grasp may have allowed a pre-filtering of object orientation (a grasp-relevant, 
but not pointing-relevant, feature), thereby reducing the effect of the distractors on the 
initial eye movement. 
4.7. Section summary 
The studies discussed in this section have provided behavioural evidence that both eye and 
hand movement preparation produce covert orienting of attention. Furthermore, this binding 
of action and perception appears to be obligatory; even when participants attempt to orient 
elsewhere, motor preparation carries attention to the action target. So, although high-level 
decisions about how to interact with the world rely on perceptual representations, once the 
decision to act has been made, visual perception becomes yoked to action. 
5. Conclusion 
We set out to show that a great deal of our daily visual processing is intimately linked with 
the motor system. Much of that processing, in fact, proceeds without our being aware of it, 
and it automatically drives our actions. We began the chapter by describing some of the 
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cortical areas that have been shown to provide direct links between incoming visual 
information and real-time motor output. Investigations of neurological conditions such as 
visual agnosia and blindsight (impaired visual awareness), optic ataxia (impaired control to 
peripheral targets), and hemispatial neglect (impaired attention and perceptual 
representation in one half of visual space) have furthered our understanding of visuomotor 
control, and many of the findings from these populations are consistent with the idea that 
visual processing in the PPC is action-related and inaccessible to conscious awareness. 
Behavioural studies in non-patient participants have also shown that vision-for-action can 
operate without any awareness on the part of the performer. For instance, masking studies 
reveal motor responses driven by unperceived stimuli; saccadic suppression studies show 
automatic responses to unperceived location changes; and motor learning studies show that 
awareness of a perturbation is not necessary for, and may even be detrimental to, 
visuomotor adaptation.  
Having demonstrated that actions can sometimes access visual information that perception 
does not, we went on to examine ways in which our actions can also dictate what our 
perceptual system sees. We discussed the link between eye movements and the pick up of 
visual information, and we provided evidence that many of our eye movements are directly 
driven by our plans for manual action. Moreover, visual attention for perception was shown to 
be bound to the saccade and/or the reach target. At the risk of overstating our case, we propose 
that one think of action as a tour guide to the gallery of the visual world; it dictates what the 
perceptual visitors get to see, and it has access to locked rooms that perception never enters. 
Author details 
Brendan D. Cameron and Gordon Binsted 
School of Health and Exercise Sciences, University of British Columbia Okanagan, Canada 
6. References 
[1] Norman J (2002) Two visual systems and two theories of perception: An attempt to 
reconcile the constructivist and ecological approaches. Behavioural and Brain Sciences 
25: 73-144. 
[2] Gibson JJ (1986) The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. New Jersey: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates. 333p. 
[3] Mishkin M, Ungerleider LG, Macko KA (1983) Object vision and spatial vision: Two 
cortical pathways. Trends in Neurosciences 6: 414-417. 
[4] Goodale MA, Milner AD (1992) Separate visual pathways for perception and action. 
Trends in Neurosciences 15: 20-25. 
[5] Milner AD, Goodale MA (2006) The Visual Brain in Action, 2nd edition. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 297p. 
[6] Glover S (2004) Separate visual representations in the planning and control of action. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27: 3-24. 
 
Visual Processing in the Action-Oriented Brain 157 
[7] Goodale MA, Milner AD, Jakobson LS, Carey DP (1991) A neurological dissociation 
between perceiving objects and grasping them. Nature 349: 154-156. 
[8] James TW, Culham J, Humphrey GK, Milner AD, Goodale MA (2003) Ventral occipital 
lesions impair object recognition but not object-directed grasping: an fMRI study. Brain 
126: 2463-2475 
[9] Aglioti S, DeSouza JFX, Goodale MA (1995) Size-contrast illusions deceive the eye but 
not the hand. Current Biology 5: 679-685. 
[10] Haffenden AM, Goodale MA (1998) The effect of pictorial illusion on prehension and 
perception. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 10: 122-136. 
[11] Westwood DA, Goodale MA (2011) Converging evidence for diverging pathways: 
Neuropsychology and psychophysics tell the same story. Vision Research 51: 804-811. 
[12] Schenk T, Franz V, Bruno N (2011) Vision-for-perception and vision-for action: which 
model is compatible with the available psychophysical and neuropsychological data? 
Vision Research 51: 812-818. 
[13] Glover S, Dixon P (2002) Dynamic effects of the Ebbinghaus illusion in grasping: 
Support for a planning/control model of action. 
[14] Rizzolatti G, Matelli M (2003) Two different streams form the dorsal visual system: 
anatomy and function. Experimental Brain Research 153: 146-157. 
[15] Pisella L, Binkofski F, Lasek K, Toni I, Rossetti Y (2006) No double-dissociation between 
optic ataxia and visual agnosia: multiple sub-streams for multiple visuo-manual 
integrations. Neuropsychologia 44: 2734-2748. 
[16] Weiskrantz L, Warrington EK, Sanders MD, Marshall J (1974) Visual capacity in the 
hemianopic field following a restricted occipital ablation. Brain 97: 709-728. 
[17] Weiskrantz L (1996) Blindsight revisited. Current Opinion in Neurobiology 6: 215-220. 
[18] Cowey A (2010) The blindsight saga. Experimental Brain Research 200: 3-24. 
[19] Poppel E, Held R, Frost D (1973) Residual visual function after brain wounds involving 
the central visual pathways in man. Nature 243: 295-296. 
[20] Perenin MT, Rossetti Y (1996) Grasping without form discrimination in a hemianopic 
field. Neuroreport 7: 793-797. 
[21] Whitwell RL, Striemer CL, Nicolle DA, Goodale MA (2011) Grasping the non-conscious: 
Preserved grip scaling to unseen objects for immediate by not delayed grasping 
following a unilateral lesion to primary visual cortex. Vision Research 51: 908-924. 
[22] Binsted G, Brownell K, Vorontsova Z, Heath M, Saucier D (2007) Visuomotor system 
uses target features unavailable to conscious awareness. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 104: 12669-12672. 
[23] Perenin MT, Vighetto A (1988) Optic ataxia: a specific disruption in visuomotor 
mechanisms. I. Different aspects of the deficit in reaching for objects. Brain 111: 643-674. 
[24] Pisella L, Grea H, Tilikete C, Vighetto A, Desmurget M, Rode G, Boisson D, Rossetti Y 
(2000) An ‘automatic pilot’ for the hand in human posterior parietal cortex: toward 
reinterpreting optic ataxia. Nature Neuroscience 3: 729-736. 
[25] Rossetti Y, Pisella L, Vighetto A (2003) Optic ataxia revisited: visually guided action 
versus immediate visuomotor control. Experimental Brain Research 153: 171-179. 
 
Visual Cortex – Current Status and Perspectives 158 
[26] Milner AD, Goodale MA (2008) Two visual systems re-viewed. Neuropsychologia 46: 
774-785. 
[27] Pisella L, Sergio L, Blangero A, Torchin H, Vighetto A, Rossetti Y (2009). Optic ataxia 
and the function of the dorsal stream: Contributions to perception and action. 
Neuropsychologia 47: 3033-3044. 
[28] McIntosh RD, Mulroue A, Blangero A, Pisella L, Rossetti Y (2011) Correlated deficits of 
perception and action in optic ataxia. Neuropsychologia 49: 131-137. 
[29] Harvey M, Rossit S (2011) Visuospatial neglect in action. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.09.030 
[30] Himmelbach M, Karnath HO (2003) Goal-directed hand movements are not affected by 
the biased space representation in spatial neglect. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 15: 
972-980. 
[31] Himmelbach M, Karnath HO, Perenin MT (2007) Action control is not affected by 
spatial neglect: A comment on Coulthard et al. Neuropsychologia 45: 1979-81. 
[32] Coulthard E, Parton A, Husain M (2006) Action control in visual neglect. 
Neuropsychologia 44, 2717-2733. 
[33] Rossit S, McIntosh RD, Malhotra P, Butler SH, Muir K, Harvey M (2011) Attention in 
action: Evidence from on-line corrections in left visual neglect. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.10.004 
[34] Rossit S, Fraser JA, Teasell R, Malhotra PA, Goodale MA (2011) Impaired delayed but 
preserved immediate grasping in a neglect patient with parieto-occipital lesions. 
Neuropsychologia 49: 2498-2504. 
[35] Milner AD, Dijkerman HC, Pisella L, McIntosh RD, Tilikete C, Vighetto A, Rossetti Y 
(2001) Grasping the past: delay can improve visuomotor performance. Current Biology 
23: 1896-1901. 
[36] Klotz W, Neumann O (1999) Motor activation without conscious discrimination in 
metacontrast masking. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance 25: 976-992. 
[37] Taylor JL, McCloskey DI (1990) Triggering of preprogrammed movements as reactions 
to masked stimuli. Journal of Neurophysiology 63: 439-446. 
[38] Cressman EK, Franks IM, Enns JT, Chua R (2007) On-line control of pointing is 
modified by unseen visual shapes. Consciousness and Cognition 16: 265-275. 
[39] Bridgeman B, Hendry D, Stark L (1975) Failure to detect displacement of the visual 
world due to saccadic eye movements. Vision Research 15: 719-722. 
[40] Bridgeman B, Lewis S, Heit G, Nagle M (1979) Relation between cognitive and motor-
oriented systems of visual position perception. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception and Performance 5: 692-700. 
[41] Goodale MA, Pelisson D, Prablanc C (1986) Large adjustments in visually guided 
reaching do not depend on vision of the hand or perception of target displacement. 
Nature 320: 748-750. 
[42] Pelisson D, Prablanc C, Goodale MA, Jeannerod M (1986) Visual control of reaching 
movements without vision of the limb. Experimental Brain Research 62: 303-311. 
 
Visual Processing in the Action-Oriented Brain 159 
[43] Prablanc C, Martin O (1992) Automatic control during hand reaching at undetected 
two-dimensional target displacements. Journal of Neurophysiology 67: 455-469. 
[44] Michel C, Pisella L, Prablanc C, Rode G, Rossetti Y (2007) Enhancing visuomotor 
adaptation by reducing error signals: single-step (aware) versus multiple-step 
(unaware) exposure to wedge prisms. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 19: 341-350. 
[45] Magescas F, Prablanc C (2006) Automatic drive of limb motor plasticity. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience 18: 75-83. 
[46] Cameron BD, Franks IM, Inglis JT, Chua R (2011) Reach adaptation to online target 
error. Experimental Brain Research 209: 171-180. 
[47] Magescas F, Urquizar C, Prablanc C (2009) Two modes of error processing in reaching. 
Experimental Brain Research 193: 337-350. 
[48] Cameron BD, Franks IM, Inglis JT, Chua R (2010) Reach adaptation to explicit vs. 
implicit target error. Experimental Brain Research 203: 367-380. 
[49] Hopp JJ, Fuchs AF (2004) The characteristics and neuronal substrate of saccadic eye 
movement plasticity. Progress in Neurobiology 72: 27-53. 
[50] Henderson JM, Hollingworth A (1999) The role of fixation position in detecting scene 
changes across saccades. Psychological Science 10: 438-443. 
[51] Deubel H, Schneider WX, Bridgeman B (1996) Postsaccadic target blanking prevents 
saccadic suppression of image displacement. Vision Research 36: 985-996.  
[52] Land M, Mennie N, Rusted J (1999) The roles of vision and eye movements in the 
control of activities of daily living. Perception 28: 1311-1328. 
[53] Johansson RS, Westling G, Backstrom A, Flanagan JR (2001) Eye-hand coordination in 
object manipulation. The Journal of Neuroscience 21: 6917-6932. 
[54] Brouwer AM, Franz VH, Gegenfurtner KR (2009) Differences in fixations between 
grasping and viewing objects. Journal of Vision 9(1): 18. 
[55] Neggers SFW, Bekkering H (2001) Gaze anchoring to a pointing target is present during 
the entire pointing movement and is driven by a non-visual signal. Journal of 
Neurophysiology 86: 961-970. 
[56] Rensink RA, O’Regan JK, Clark JJ (1997) To see or not to see: The need for attention to 
perceive changes in scenes. Psychological Science 8: 368-373. 
[57] Simons DJ, Chabris CF (1999) Gorillas in our midst: sustained inattentional blindness 
for dynamic events. Perception 28: 1059-1074. 
[58] Allport A (1987) Selection for action: some behavioural and neurophysiological 
considerations of attention and action. In: Heuer H, Sanders AF, editors. Perspectives 
on Perception and Action. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. pp. 395-420. 
[59] Rizzolatti G, Riggio L, Dascola I, Umilta C (1987) Reorienting attention across the 
horizontal and vertical meridians: evidence in favor of a premotor theory of attention. 
Neuropsychologia 25: 31-40. 
[60] Tipper SP, Lortie C, Baylis GC (1992) Selective reaching: evidence for action-centered 
attention. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 18: 
891-905. 
 
Visual Cortex – Current Status and Perspectives 160 
[61] Schneider WX (1995) VAM: a neuro-cognitive model for visual attention control of 
segmentation, object recognition, and space-based motor action. Visual Cognition 2: 
331-375. 
[62] Rizzolatti G, Riggio L, Sheliga BM (1994) Space and selective attention. In: Umilta C, 
Moscovitch M, editors. Attention and Performance XV. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 
231-265. 
[63] Moore T, Fallah M (2001) Control of eye movements and spatial attention. Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences 98: 1273-1276. 
[64] Muller JR, Philiastides MG, Newsome WT (2005) Microstimulation of the superior 
colliculus focuses attention without moving the eyes. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 102: 524-529. 
[65] Meegan DV, Tipper SP (1998) Reaching into cluttered visual environments: spatial and 
temporal influences of distracting objects. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology 51A: 225-249. 
[66] Desmurget M, Pelisson D, Rossetti Y, Prablanc C (1998) From eye to hand: planning 
goal-directed movements. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 22: 761-788. 
[67] Schneider WX, Deubel H (2002) Selection-for-perception and selection-for-spatial-
motor-action are coupled by visual attention: A review of recent findings and new 
evidence from stimulus-driven saccade control. In: Hommel B, Prinz W, editors. 
Attention and Performance XIX. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 609-627. 
[68] Deubel H, Schneider WX (1996) Saccade target selection and object recognition: 
Evidence for a common attentional mechanism. Vision Research 36: 1827-1837. 
[69] Deubel H, Schneider WX, Paprotta I (1998) Selective dorsal and ventral processing: 
Evidence for a common attentional mechanism in reaching and perception. Visual 
Cognition 5: 81-107. 
[70] Deubel H, Schneider WX (2003) Delayed saccades, but not delayed manual aiming 
movements, require visual attention shifts. Annals of the New York Academy of 
Sciences 1004: 289-296. 
[71] Baldauf D, Wolf M, Deubel H (2006) Deployment of visual attention before sequences of 
goal-directed hand movements. Vision Research 46: 4355-4374. 
[72] Bekkering H, Neggers SFW (2002) Visual search is modulated by action intentions. 
Psychological Science 13: 370-374. 
